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Reference: DEPTTEL 1082

When I saw Chancellor this morning and gave him the President's letter, together with summary of contents TOPOL 578 (repeated Bonn 1081), there ensued long discussion of events recent months. Drift of Adenauer's remarks was that we should have moved earlier against Castro, and that even now as matter of tactics we should build him up as principal villain in piece. Chancellor seemed to feel that by doing so we might rally support among Cuban people, and at same time make it easier for Khrushchev to stand aside while we dealt with Cuban problem by military means. I debated with him, but he was not swayed, saying among other things that we should at latest have gone to military solution when US plane was shot down yesterday. Chancellor implied "paper war" with Khrushchev had gone on too long and should be discontinued. I finally was able to ask him directly what he thought we should do now. Boiled down, his views are as follows:

1. We should issue ultimatum to Castro, and follow up by invasion unless he responds affirmatively within brief period to our demand for removal Soviet missiles.
2. If further incident occurs, even before ultimatum, we should take whatever military actions seems appropriate, not excluding invasion.

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-2- 1234, October 28, 2 p.m. from Bonn

There followed some discussion between Globke, who was also present, and Chancellor as to whether it would be easier for Khrushchev to accept invasion of Cuba or serial destruction of missile sites, with Globke arguing for serial destruction and Chancellor insisting on invasion, which he thought was only ultimate solution to Cuban problem and hence had better be done at once. They were agreed, however, on Chancellor's basic view that our response now must be military one.

Re NATO consultation, Chancellor said he would consult Carstens and have necessary instructions sent to German Permanent Representative, although I cautioned him that NAC probably already met. He said German participation would have to be through Deputy (Salm) since Walter had left Paris and Grewe not due there until tomorrow. I told him I would brief Carstens as soon as I could reach him.

DOWLING

AJT

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